dispositions | causation | modality



Workshop 7-9 March 12 Cologne DFG Research Group

Cologne 7 - 9 March 2012

DFG Research Group on

Causation | Laws | Dispositions | Explanation Workshop: Dispositions, Causes, Modality

Convenors

Arno Goebel, Andreas Hüttemann, Alexander Reutlinger, and Markus Schrenk

Important Dates

7-9 March 2012 Workshop 31 January 2012 Registration

Registration

Please send an email to arno.goebel@gmx.de by the end of January to express your interest in participating. We can unfortunately offer only a limited number of places. There's no registration fee but we will ask for a donation for coffee and buiscuits.

Further Information

on the Research Group and the Workshop can be found on our website: http://www.clde.uni-koeln.de

Abstract

Some dispositionalists—philosophers who defend the view that many or all properties have an irreducible dispositional nature—have recently claimed that causal powers, capacities, tendencies, etc. bring their own kind of modality to the world which is neither eliminable by counterfactual conditionals nor reducible to natural or metaphysical necessity. Forces or vectors sometimes serve as a preliminary characterization of a disposition's sui generis modality.

However, such a theory of dispositional modality has yet to be spelled out in detail. It would also have to reveal how dispositions and causation are related. This workshop wishes to investigate into the possibility (or impossibility) of such a project.

If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact one of the organisers:

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Keynote Speakers

Helen Beebee

Against Dispositional Essentialism

Ralf Busse

Existence, Essence, and Law

Richard Corry

Powers take the Field

Jonathan Jacobs

How to be an Aristotelian and a Reductionist about Modality

James Ladyman

Dispositions and Forces

Olivier Massin

When forces meet each other

Barbara Vetter

How to be a Dispositionalist about Possibility

Daniel von Wachter

Causes do not Necessitate their Effect

Neil Williams

The Significance of Causal Relevance